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A . INTRODUCTION 
Marshalling is [ an equitable] doctrine which enables a 
person who has no security in law or equity against (an] 
asset .. . to become subrogated to such a claim, if the 
creditor entitled to resort to this and other assets by his 
election deprives him of his security . 
Marshalling is an established part of New Zealand law
2 and the 
purpose of this paper 1s to provide ~he first definitive acc oun 
of it in New Zealand. 
As marshalling claims are relatively uncommon all aspects of the 
doctrine are canvassed , but for the most part this paper deals 
with ma rshal 1 ing as between secured creditors as opposed to 
marshalling between beneficiaries under an estate, the other 
area where marsha ling is applicable . 
Five of the major issues are, the juridical nature of 
marshalling , the exercise of a marshalling claim, the 
limitations of marshalling , marshalling in relation to third 
parti es a nd covenants preventing marshalling . The juridical 
nature of ma rshalling is discussed , because since it s creation 
the basis upon which a marshalling claim is exercised has 
remained a moot point . This has caused much uncertainty in 
relation to the exercise of marshalling claims , so it too is 
discussed . There is more certainty as to the limitations of 
marshalling , but for conciseness these are also set out in full . 
Mar s h a lling in relation to third parties (unsecured creditors 
and v olunt ee r s ) is the most contentious issue yet to be s ettled 
and is di scussed at length . This is because marshalling is 
generally concerned only with the position of secured creditors 
and because equity does not generally assist volunteers . One of 
the final issues to be discussed is covenants preventing 
1 Bisset v Australia and New Zea and Bank Ltd [1961] NZLR 
687 , 694 . 
2 Brigham v Saunders (1880) O.B & F 66 ; Ollivier and Other s 
v Colonial Bank (18 8 7) 5 NZLR 2 3 9 ; The King v The Westport 
Harbour Board (1905) 25 NZLR 449; In re Islip , Ex parte Official 
Assi gnee (1907) 26 NZLR 1923; Re Stephenson (1910) 30 NZLR 145; 
New Zealand Loan and Mercantile Agency Co v Loach (1911) 31 NZLR 
292 ; Re Taylor , Ex parte Dalgety & Co (1934] NZLR 117 ; In re 
Tremain , Tremain v Publi c Trustee [1934] NZLR 369 ; In re Ainge , 
Wheeler v Bank of Austra lia [193:J NZLR 691; In re Watkins , 
Guardian Trust and Execut ors Co v Watkins (1938] NZLR 847 ; In re 
Coote , Coote v Public Trus ee [1939] NZLR 457 ; Bisset v Australia 
and New Zealand Bank Ltd (19 l] NZLR 687 ; Re Manawatu Transport 
Ltd (1984) 2 NZCLC 99 , 084 
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marshalling. At present, marshalling's far reaching application 
is not well utilised. However, if and when marshalling becomes 
mo re prominent 'c ovenant s p reven ::_ ng ma rsha 11 ing' is likely t o 
be the largest gr o wth a r e a 1n respect of legal development. 
B . WHAT IS MARSHALLING? 
Marshalling was c reated b y he Chancery Courts of the mid-
eighteenth Cent u r y as a response to t h e c laims of creditors that 
t h e recovery o f debts fr om ba~krupcs ~as being f rustrated b y the 
prejudicial act s o f pri o r creditors . ~o r ex amp l e: 
CHARGOR 
Property X 
Chargee A 
Chargee B 
Pr operty Y 
Chargee A 
In this examp le , the c ha rgo r c harges properties X and Y in 
favour of A as se c urity f o r a d ebt . The chargor then charges 
property X in favour of Bas se c urity for an o ther debt. Here A 
can frustrate B's chances of rec o vering its debt by satisfying 
its own debt from X, the doubly charged property , rather than 
seeking recourse from Y, the singly c harged property. To avoid 
this outcome, marshal 1 ing provides that, 1 f A acts in such a 
prejudicial manner, Bis entitled t o 'marshal' against A for any 
'surplus security' still hel d over Y3 • In other words, 
marshalling gives B access t o pr opert y in which it had no prior 
interest. 
C. SOME WORKING DEFINITIONS 
It is important at this ear ly st ag e t o def i ne some of the terms 
used in this paper. 
A 'multiple c h argee' 
security' to which a 
i s a secured c ~ ed1 tor who h o lds 'surplu s 
'sing l e c h argee ' wi shes t o gain access. 
'Surplus security' is a f und consisting of the unused o r 
leftover property o f the mu l t iple chargee ' s security agreement. 
It is 'unused o r left over' in the sense th a t is not required t o 
satisfy the multiple chargee's debt. 
Unless the context otherwise requ ires, 'property' denotes both 
real and personal property. 
Finally, a 'charge' den o tes any s 1 t ua t 1 on in whi c h 'property' 
is encumbered whether i t b e by charge , lien , mo rtgage or pledge. 
Lanoy v Du c hess o f Atho 174 2) 2 At k 4 4 4, 2 6 ER 6 6 8. 
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D. THE JURIDICAL NATURE OF MARSHALLING 
A fundamental problem in marshalling is that, even though the 
doctrine was created almost two h 'ndred and fifty years ago, the 
juridical nature of marshalling (the basis upon which the 
doctrine is applied) is ye to be se tled. 
There are two different schools of thought as to the juridical 
nature of marshalling . The firs schoo: suggests that the right 
of the single chargee to have rhe doc:r:ne applied in its favour 
is 'proprietary'. The other school suggests that the right to 
marshal is less than proprietary and is akin to that of a right 
of subrogation, i . e . to be subrogated to the position of the 
multiple chargee in respect of the surplus security . 
1 . PROPRIETARY INTEREST 
The proprietary interest school believes that the single chargee 
has an equitable interes in the surplus security held by the 
multiple chargee. This is evidenced by the English case of 
Lawrence v Galsworthy. ~ There the first mortgagee under a 
mortgagee ' s sale sold both lots of property subject to the 
security a greement to recoup its debt. It then returned the 
funds including the surplus security to the mortgagor . This 
discharged the mortgage over which the second mortgagee claimed 
marshalling rights. The Court held, that although the purchaser 
of the property was a purchasers for value, it had notice of the 
second mortgagee ' s claim and was compelled to recognise it. The 
sale was set aside and the single chargee was granted access to 
the p roperty to satisfy its debt . 
On the assumption , for the moment, that the ' proprietary 
interest ' school correctly analyses the doctrine, questions then 
arise how and when this interes is created . 
In theory the interest, and therefore the right to marshal, 
cannot arise before the mul iple chargee has satisfied its deb . 
If it did, the single chargee ight have a caveatable interest 
in the singly charged security and ccu d inhibit the multiple 
chargee ' s freedom of realisation of he property . It is a common 
misconception that marsha :1ng ena0.es a single chargee to 
direct the multiple chargee o realise is security in such a 
way to cause the least preJudice to common property (property 
charged bot by the multiple chargee and the single chargee). One 
4 (1857) 3 Jur (NS) 1049 , (1857) 30 The Law Times 112 . 
' If the interest is an interes in land it is caveatable 
under sections 136 and 13' of he Lar.d Trans fer Act. This , in 
effect , prevents any dispos1t_ons 0f he in erest. 
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of the fundamental principles of marshalling i s t hat the 
operation of the doctrine does not res rain the mult ip le c hargee 
from realising the security of its choice . b To hol d otherwise 
would be to diminish the multiple chargee's prior and paramount 
claim in favour of a subsequent encumbrancer with a weaker 
security . Equity stops short of imposing upon the multiple 
chargee any obligation to keep he secGrity agreement alive for 
the benefit of the single chargee . 
Therefore, any equitab e inter-esi:. , :.!"'.e s rp:'..us security and 
any right to marshal is exting ish~d upon the bona fide transfer 
of the charged property to a third person or upon the discharge 
of the multiple chargee ' s security agreement . 
There are , however , three reasons why the proprietary school 
does not correctly analyse the doc rine. 
First , it follows that if he single chargee has an equitable 
interest in the surplus security , then he multiple chargee can 
simply assign the legal inte!'."es over o he single chargee . 
However , it has been said that " the operation of the marshalling 
principle depends upon the assets being subject in some way to 
6 Union Bank of Georgetown v Laird (1817) 15 US 390, 392; 
Wallis v Woodyear (1885) 2 Jur (NS) 179; Ernst Bros Co v Canada 
Permanent Mortgage Corp (1921) 57 DLR 500 , 505 ; Common wealth 
Trading Bank v Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1970) 
Tas SR 120 , 128 ; Re O' Leary , Ex parte Bayne (1985) 61 ALR 674 , 
680 ; Mir Bros Projects Pty v Lyons (1977] 2 NSWLR 192 , 196 ; Deta 
Nominees Pty Ltd v Viscount Plastic Products Pty Ltd (1979] VLR 
167 , 192 ; Re Manawatu Transport Ltd (1984) 2 NZCLC 99 , 084 , 
99,087 ; First Investors Corporatio~ v Veeradon Developments Ltd 
(1988) 47 DLR 4th 446, 451. See Webb v Smi h (1885) 30 ChD 192, 
200; Bank of NSW v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1969] 
VR 556, 557 for the contrary argument. There is also an exception 
to the rule, that may or may no still exist. Where an agent 
pledges the goods of its principal and goods of its own as 
security for a debt it owes , the case law suggests that the 
principal may compel the cred · tors o seek recourse from the 
agent ' s goods first: Broadbent v Barlow (1861) 3 De G. F . &J 870; 
Ex parte Alston (1868) LR 4 Ch App 168; Ex parte Salting (1883) 
25 ChD 148; Re Burge Woodall & Co [1912) 1 KB 393 . The 
correctness of these cases is questionable , especially , when 
compared with the majority of the modern cases that support the 
view that marshalling cannot operate to restrain the multiple 
chargee from realising the security of its choice. 
7 Commonwealth Trading Bank v Co::. or. 1 al Mut. ua l Life Assurance 
Society Ltd (1970) Tas SR 120 , :32 . 
6 
the control of the court . .. ". ' _n the leading New Zealand 
authority on marshalling, Re Manawa "u Transport, Eichelbaum J 
cites with approval a simi la r s ta te me n t.: "if the matter is under 
the Court's control ... ". · Th e appare n t necessity of judicial 
consent to transfer surplus security, indicates an interest 
somewhat less than proprietary. 
Secondly, there is n o r ecen jGdic ial support for the 
proprietary interest school a pa r from in American cases . 
10 
Thirdly, there is much jl:d::.C.!.c1- ~ .f--90.r: fo r the idea tha t 
marshalling is not a proprie cry 1::.g~c , ou t an 'equitabl e 
remedy' sought in lieu of the po ss i bility that the single 
chargee ' s security might be prejudi c ed by the multiple chargee's 
realisation of common securities. Marshalling "is no more than 
[a right] to seek a remedy wh ich the court will in certain 
circumstances grant " . :, 
2. SUBROGATION 
Having argued against t he ex i stence of any proprietary interest, 
the analysis o f the d oc rine as e1 r igh t o f 'subrogation' will 
now be considered. 
Under the subrogation analysis the single chargee has a right 
to apply to the courts co be subrogated to the rights of the 
multiple chargee in respect of the surplus security . This right 
of subrogation arises once the multiple chargee depletes common 
property such that the single chargee 1s unable to satisfy its 
debt fully. The single chargee mus t h en apply to the courts t o 
6 Commonwea l th Tradi nq Bank r1970: Ta s SR 120, 128; Webb v 
Smith (1885) 30 Cho 192, 2 00 . 
' (1984) 2 NZ CLC 99 , 084 , 99 , v87 . uo e fr o m Ha l sbury' s La ws 
of England . (4th ed, Butterwo r hs 19 8 0 ) Vol 16, para 1426. 
Hereafter referred to as "Halsbu r y' s ". 
:c Meyer v United State s (1963) 375 US 2 3 3; Markman v Russe l 
State Bank (1966) 35 8 F. 2d 4 88 ; U. S. v Le May (1972) 346 F.Supp 
328; In re Penn Cent Tra n spo r t Co ( l972) 3 4 6 F.Supp 1323; Seasons 
Inc v Atwell 527 P.2d 7 92 ; Bar 1 '/ v Pi keville National Bank & 
Trust Co (1976) 532 S .W. 2d 44 6 . 
n Ernst Bros Co (1921) 5 7 DLR 500 , 50 5; Commonwealth Trading 
Bank [1970] Tas SR 12 0 , 1 28 ; Re O' Leary (1 985) 61 ALR 674, 680; 
Mir Bros Projec ts Pty v Ly ons [1977) 2 NS WLR 192, 196; Deta 
Nominees Pty Ltd (1979) VLR 16' , 192 ; Re Manawatu Transport Ltd 
(1984) 2 NZCLC 99,084, 9 9 , 087 . 
'
2 Above, n 7 , 1 30 . 
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marshal against the multiple chargee, that is, to be subrogated 
to the multiple chargee' s rights in respect of the surplus 
security . However, this right is extinguished upon either the 
bona fide transfer of the surplus security to a third party or 
the discharge of the security agreement, for in these cases the 
single chargee has nothing to be subrogated to. 
Under the subrogation analysis, marshalling does not create an 
'equitable interest' in the st... r plus sec urity , only an 'equity' 
(or a ' mere equ i ty'). Th<='re 1s r:c.> -.:ciic ial s · pport for this 
proposition , but th e cJ-a r d::t.erist~-:s o f che subrogation 
analysis, that there is a 'personal' c laim against the multiple 
chargee and that any claim is defeated by a 'bona fide transfer' 
of the surplus security, are consistent with the concept of an 
'equity' . 13 
Also, treated as an 'equity ', marshalling remedies the situation 
where the multiple chargee disposes of the charged property in 
bad faith and there is kn o wl edge o f this bad faith on the part 
of the third party transferee . The c l a im of a person who takes 
with notice of an equity i s somet imes subject t.o that equity. ·
4 
Alternatively, it can be argued that, once the multiple chargee 
has notice of the single chargee's claim , a fiduciary 
relationship arises. The nature of this fiduciary relationship 
is that the multiple chargee must act in good faith towards the 
single chargee ' s claim and upon a transfer in bad faith of the 
surplus security to a third party , who takes with knowledge of 
this bad faith, a constructive trust attaches to the surplus 
security and it becomes traceable. There is , also, no judicial 
support for this proposition, but if the necessary facts arise 
it is unlikely that the Courts will be unwilling to attach some 
liability to the multiple cha r gee and a ny third party transferee 
where there is an absen c e o f good fa i h . " 
13 Modern Equity. H. G. Hanbury and R.H. Maudsley . ( Stevens & 
Son Ltd 1989, 13th ed . ) 8 71. 
1 4 Idem. 
1
; Phipps v Boardman [196 7 ] 2 AC 4 6 . 
16 "Third party tran s fere e ", he r e , al so includes the chargor . 
8 
-4 . 
Marshalling as a remedy akin o subrogation is the most 
prevalent view in the case law 1n New Zealand I and has support 
in Australia , 8 Canada • and England. ' This interpretation also 
avoids the objections to the proprie ary interest analysis . • ; 
Al so , the d octrine has broad appl i ea ion . It applies to all 
consensual security interests and pledges. 72 
From a New Zealand perspective the best summation of the 
doctr ine is that first quoted in the introduction . 
Marshal ling is a doctrine which enables a person who has 
no security in law or eq~-:_..- 1 arJa1,,s..- (an] asset ... to become 
subrogated to such a c:airr , if che c reditor entitled to 
res ort to this and other assets by his election deprives 
him of his security . 2 J 
17 Above, n2. 
18 Co mm on we a l t h Trad i n q Bank [ 1 9 7 0 J Ta s SR 1 2 0 , 12 8 ; Mi r 
Bros Projects Pty (1977) 2 NSWLR 192 , 196 ; Re O' Leary (1985) 61 
ALR 6 7 4 , 6 8 0 . 
; 9 Ernst Bros (1921) 5..., D'n 5CC , 505 ; First Investment ~t' 
Corporation (1988) 4 7 DLR 4th -~ ..J b / 4::Jl / 452, 453 . 
20 Aldridge V Forbes ( 1839) 4 Jur 20 ; Re Mower ' s Trusts 
( 18 69) LR 8 Eq 111. 
21 Subrogation is a remedy' (obje r_ ion 4) , for which a single 
chargee must apply to the courts (objec ion 1) , and since there 
is no proprietary interest it cannc oe depleted (objection 2) . 
Further , it has judicial support (obJection 3) . 
22 Fisher & Liqhtwood ' s 1 dv: of mo rtgage . W.R.Fisher , 
E.L . G . Tyler and J .M. Lightwood. (Butcerworths 1977, 9th ed . ) Para 
446 (hereafter refered to as " Fisher & Li ghtwood " ). As to liens 
see Trimmer v Bayne (1803) 9 Ves 209 and Sproule v Prior (1826) 
8 Sum 187. As to pledges see above, n6. 
23 Above, nl. 
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E . THE AMERICAN POSITION' 4 
It is intere s ting t o compa re the conclusio n reached above (that 
marshalling is a remedy aki n co subrogation) with the view taken 
by the American courts. In the se cou rcs marshalling is seen as 
a double edged sw o rd, n o t o nl y a s a r eme d y (by subrogation), but 
also as a 'right': the sing le chargee can compel the multiple 
chargee to exhaust the si ngly charged property before seeking 
recourse to the commo n pro pe rty . However , as discussed earlier, 
by all o wi ng the single charge c o d1re 2 : the multiple charge e t o 
realise the s ec ur i tie s in a ma n:, e r c. hat e a uses the least 
prejudice to the single chargee , the mu ltiple chargee ' s prior 
and paramount c l aim is s ubjected to the c laim of a subsequent 
and weaker encumbrancer. ' 6 This affords t he single chargee too 
much power. The purpose o f hav ing a 'pri o r' claim to ' multiple ' 
securities is for the mul t i p le chargee b o th t o ensure repayment 
if each property, by itself, is i nsufficient and to have 
priority over tho se propert i es in sati sfying its debt . This 
entitlement of the mul t ipl e c h argee shoul d n ot then be subjected 
to the subsequent c laim of c he single cha r gee . In the autho r' s 
opinion, marshalling as a re medy akin to s ubr ogati o n is the most 
'equitable' analysis of t he doc ri ne , in that the multip l e 
chargee ' s rights remain para·mount a nd at the same time the 
single chargee is granted a ccess to a lternative property to 
satisfy its debt. 
F. THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE 
1. WHO IS ENTITLED TO MARSHAL? 
It is accepted that marshalli n g a pplies in favour of a single 
chargee , but who then is a single chargee? A single chargee i s : 
1. Any pers on cl a i ming property subject to the multip le 
c h a rgee ' s secu r i y ag re P!r e ~. ; ar: ~ 
2. Wh o has a subsequent or reve rsi o nary interest i n 
multiply c harged property ; and 
3 . Who s e interes t i s jeopardised o r prejudiced by the 
realisati on of common propercy by a multiple c hargee . 
24 for the purpose of this paper the j ur isdictions of the 
Un ited States o f Amer ica shall be c.rea ed as o ne. 
2, Abo ve n ll. See a lso F . W. Koger and P . Accon c i a "Marshal ling: 
A Fourth Act Sequel To Commercial Tragedi e s ?" (1989) 57 UMK CLR 
20 5 , 207 . 
26 See Th e J uridi c a l Nature of Marshalling page 5. 
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The definition of single chargee does nc include the debtor or 
charger itself , nor its rus ee ir. ba. kruptcy , its personal 
representative(s) 2 nor o her persons who do not , for value , take 
by assignment, charge o~ c~nvcjdn~e ~ a~ act al interest in on 
of the securities . 28 However, a 'single' chargee may have more 
than one security . For example : 
X y z 
8 3 
C 
In this situation Bis paten ially a single chargee in relation 
to A, because A is a person who has a prior interest in common 
property, 1 , who could prejudice B' s charge over 1 by realising 
1 before i to satisfy its debt . Conversely , A is a multiple 
cha r gee because A has access to property in satisfaction of its 
debt that B has no interest in . However, in respect of C both A 
and Bare multiple chargees because of their access to X and Z. 
2 . WHOM DOES THE DOCTRINE AFFECT? 
A single chargee is able o marshal only by virtue of surplus 
security held by the mul iple chargee over an undischarged 
securit y agreement . For this reason, a multiple chargee is a 
necessary party to any marshalling proceedings. The operation 
of t he doctrine will , however, affect various other parties : the 
debtor or charger itself, its trustee or equivalent in 
ban k ruptcy , its personal representative(s) and , possibly , other 
sing l e creditors . 
The multiple charger is not af:ec~e by marshalling claims, 
because, as explained earlier, marsha_:1ng in New Zealand does 
not. operate to res rain ~h real:.·a~=--~- of he securities held 
by the multiple chargee . 1 Le rnu::. lf-J~t: c:.argee has a prior anci 
paramount claim to the property . 
27 Re Fox (1856) 1 ChD S~l ; A sley v Newman (1870) 39 LJ Ch 
769 . See also 32 Halsbury' s para :c ar.-:1 i:isher & Lightwood 448. 
28 See page 23 for the position of unsecured creditors and 
volunteers . 
29 See The Juridical Nat.ure of Marshalling page 5 . 
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3 . EXERCISING A CLAIM TO MARSHAL 
A marshalling claim by a single chargee is gene rally established 
by giving notice of it o eh~ ~~!t!~_e chargee. A marshallin g 
cla im cannot be given too early , but 1t can be given too late. 
For example, a claim is 1neffec 1ve if made after the 
disposition of the surplus security o a third party or if the 
multiple chargee' s security agreement. is discharged . In these 
cases the singl e chargee has nothing to be subrogated to. The 
only option for the single chargee 1s to prove bad faith on the 
part of the multiple chargee , i~ which case the single chargee 
may be able to trace the surplus security into the hands of 
third parties , who also took in bad faith. 1 
In order to exercise a claim o marshal, a single chargee must 
commence proceedings ' after the creat ion of the ' surp lus 
security ' and before the surplus security is extinguished. If, 
however , proceedings cannot be commenced in time , an injuncti on 
quia timet might be possible, restraining the multiple chargee 
from transferring the surplus security or discharging the 
security agreement . 1 ' 
Therefore , it is importan t fot the singl e chargee both to give 
notice of a marshalling claim'' and to be prepared to commence 
proceedings before or upon the creation of the surplus security. 
No marsha 11 ing c 1 aim is guaranteed. It is not an enforceable 
interest , it is only a r 1ght "to seek a remedy which the court 
will in certain circumstances grant" . 0 ' 
30 Bad faith here could be defined as any 
knowingly defeat a single chargee ' s marshalling 
ul imately it will be up ,-- r_p >,,rr~ -o deci e . 
attempt 
claim , 
3
: See The Juridical Nature o Marshalling page 8 . 
to 
but 
32 Proceedings generally take the form of an or iginating 
summons . 
33 Quia timet prevents tha which is feared as a future 
injury . To succeed two requirements mus be satisfied . First , if 
there is no actual damage then future damage must be highly 
likely , if not imminent. Secondly, he likely damage must be 
substantial . Fletcher v Bealey (188Sl 28 Ch 658 ; Morri s v Redlan d 
Bricks Ltd (1970) AC 652. 
34 As of yet there is no evidence of any d octr ine of 
' constructive notice ' of marsha ling claims . 
3
; Above n 7 , 13 0 . 
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G. LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO MARSHAL 
Marshalling generally benef1 s he sina~e chargee who is granted 
access to surplus secur1cy oef'.)t~ 1t rever ts back to the 
charger . However, there are a '."'umber of limitations on the 
doctrine. These limitations a cempt to balance the competing 
interests of all the parties involved . Some have already been 
outlined36 and , in this secti on of this paper , the others will be 
examined . 
1 . No right to marshal exiscs wnere tne multiple chargee does 
not have equal right of recourse to each property to satisfy its 
debt: for example, where the multiple chargee is bound to resort 
to one property before resorc1ng o another or where the 
mult i ple chargee only has access to a singly charged property to 
the extent that a multiply charged ~roperty is insufficient . 37 
This limitation is a useful means for a charger to prevent a 
single chargee from being granted access to surplus security in 
which it had no prior interest and will be developed further 
under J. Covenancs Preventing Marshalling. 
2 . Mar shalling will not operate to che prejudice of third 
pa r ti e s . 38 
3 . Both the properties muse have been in existence when the 
marshalling claim arises. ·• 
36 The creation and extingu1shmen of a marshalling claim. 
37 In re The "Priscilla" (1859) Lush 1 , 167 ER l; Douglas v 
Cooksey (1868) 2 IR Eq 311 , 315 ; Dolphin v Aylward (1870) LR 4 HL 
486 , 505 ; Webb v Smith (18 85) 30 ChD 192; Public Trustee v Alder 
[1922] 1 Ch 154 ; Re Holland [1928] SR NSW 369 , 378 , 379 ; Miles v 
Official Receiver [1963] ALR 620 . See also Equity , doctrines and 
remedies . R.P.Meagher, W. M. C . Gummow and J.R . F . Lehane. 
(Butterworths 1984, 2ed.) Para 1111 , 1112 (referred to as 
" Meagher " ) and 16 Halsbury' s 1:-~ara ~4r' . 
38 See I. Marshal ing 1. Relo.ti.)n 1'.) -:'hird Parties , page 23. 
39 Re Professional Life Assurance Co (1867) LR 3 Eq 668 , 680 ; 
Re International Life Assurance Society (1876) 2 ChD 476. 
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4. Both the multiply charged pr opert y and the singly charged 
property must have been 
c hargee as se c urity f o r 
charge d in 
he same de b t . 
favour of the 
Fo r example : 
multiple 
1. X 
A (Charged as s ecurity 
for debt 1) 
B 
y 
A (Ch arged as security 
f o r debt 2) 
Two properties charged fo r di f fe r ent debts . 
2 . X 
A (Charged as secur i t y 
f o r debt 1) 
B 
y 
A (Charged as security 
fo r debt 1) 
Two properties c harged f o r t he same debt . 
Marshalling will only operat e in t he second scenario . The 
doctrine cannot operate in the first scenario because there will 
be no surplus security under X if A realises~ to satisfy debt 
1. In the first scenario B cannot be subrogated to the rights of 
A under y because A still h ol ds those rights; debt 2 is still to 
be satisfied. The only ex c ept ion is a Barnes v Racster 41 type 
situation .For e xample : 
X 
A (Charged as security 
for debt 1) 
B 
y 
A (Charged as security 
for debt 1 and debt 2) 
A c harge is g ive n ove r~ in fav ou r o f A as sec r ity for debt 1 , 
r is then charged in f av o r o f B. Finally , Y is charged in 
favour of A as se c urity f or debt 2 and debt 1 . Because y is als o 
security for debt 1, Bis enti tled to ma r shal against A's rights 
under y once A has satisfied debt 2. 
~
0 Re O' Leary (19 8 5) 61 _Zl,'..,F, G7 4 . 
4
: (1842) 1 y & c .c .c . 401 , 
14 
2 ER 94 4. 
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5 . For marshalling to opera e , the claim must be against the 
same chargor ( s) . 42 
The authority generally ciced fer this propos ition is Ex parte 
Kendal 1. 43 In cha c case , the 1 e 0t1e ce five debtors who were 
jointly and severally liable for debcs owing to certain 
creditors . There was als o anocher se of c reditors seeking to 
recover debts owed by four or the deotors . These four debtors 
became bankrupt and their credi ors sought to marshal against 
the creditors of all five for the surp:us security held over the 
solvent fifth debtor. 
Debtorl 
A 
B 
Debtor2 
A 
B 
Debtor] 
A 
B 
Debtor4 
A 
B 
Debtors 
A 
It was held that marshalling was no applicable in this case as 
the creditors' claims were against different debtors, rather 
than claims against the property of the same debtors. 
It is accepted in New Zealand that there is only one exception 
to this , the ' common debtor' r ·u1e. 4 ·' The exception operates where 
B holds a charge over the property of Chargor 1 , over whom there 
is also a prior charge held by A, for which Chargor 2 is 
principally liable . For example: 
Chargor 1 
Surety 
A 
B 
Cha rgor 2 
Principal 
A 
In this situation , if A prejudices B's charge over the property 
of Cha rgor 1, B can marshal aaains a1 y surplus security held by 
A over Chargor 2 , because Chargor 2 is ' principally' liable for 
the debt owed to A. It is in effect Chargor 2 ' s debt. 
42 Carters v Tanners Leacher Co (1907) 81 E 902 ; New Zealand 
Loan and Mercantile Agency Company v Loach (191 2 ) 31 NZLR 292: 
Re Taylor (1934) NZLR 117; Ernst Bros (1921) 57 DLR 500; Savings 
and Loan Corp v Bear (1930) 154 SE 587 ; Re Manawatu Transport 
(1984) 2 NZCLC 99,084. See also Meagher para 1109 and 16 
Halsbury ' s para 1427 .. 
43 (1811) 34 ER 199 , [1803 - 13] A:l ER Rep 295 . 
44 New Zealand Mercantile and Loan v Loach (1912) 31 NZLR 
292 , Re Manawatu Transpor (1984) 2 NZCL 99 , 084 . 
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The following is a discussi on of he two New Zealand authorities 
for this exception . 
In New Zealand Mercantile; a mortgage over two properties was 
granted in favour of A (the multiple chargee) . The two 
properties were owned separately by the principal and the 
surety. Later, the principa l granted a seco nd mortgage over his 
own property in fav our of the claimant , B . 
Chargor 1 
Pri ncipal 
A 
B 
Charqor 2 
Surety 
A 
To the detriment of B, the multiple chargee satisfied its debt 
by realising its security over the land o wned by the principal, 
Chargor 1. The claimant company, B, argu ed that, in the event of 
A satisfying its debt from Charoor 2 , the surety, the right of 
the surety to be subrogated t o he security hel d by A over the 
principal is inferior to the right of the single chargee, B, t o 
have its debt satisfied by the principal . Therefore, the single 
chargee should be able to marshal against A's rights over the 
surety. However, the court held that if the multiple chargee , A, 
decides to enforce its right to payment from the principal , 
Chargor 2, B cannot marsha 1 against the rights of A over the 
surety, because the surety is only secondarily liable for the 
debt. The surety can only be called upon by A to satisfy the 
principal ' s debt. In this situation, the surety is entitled to 
be subrogated to A' s rights against the principal and this 
entitlement ranks ahead of B's. 
The same decision was reached by Eichelbaum J in Re Manawatu 
Transport . 46 That case inv o lved three companies in receivership 
with a dispute over the payment ::: f debentures . The plaintiff 
company , UDC , applied to th e co rt -o r a marsha ling order to be 
subrogated to the rights of the two multiple chargees, BNZ and 
BP, against the sureties, Reliance and Wanganui. 
Manawat u 
(Principal) 
BNZ 
BP 
UDC 
Rel i ance 
( S r ':'::. y) 
BNZ 
BP 
Wanganui 
(Surety ) 
BNZ 
45 New Zealand Mercant ile and Lo an v Loach (1912) NZLR 292. 
46 (1984) 2 NZCLC 99 , 084. 
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Citing Ex parte Kendall Eichelbaum J stated: 
[A)lthough the funds belong o different parties , the 
requirement of a common deo:or is negatived where as 
between the owner of the f~nd charged once and the owner of 
the fund charged twice, the re is an obligation on the 
former to bear the bu~ e~ of all charges as between 
themselves . 
Further on he sta ed: 
UDC wishes to throw the Bank of New Zealand on to Wanganui 
and Reliance , but the relationship of the latter two 
companies to Manawatu is not that of principal to surety , 
but of surety to principal. Thus ... there is no common 
debtor , and ... the fac s ... a re a positive obstacle to the 
applicability of marshalling. ,, 
The majority of the cases and te~:ts·· support the conclusion that 
Re Manawatu was correctly decided and hat he principal/sure y 
distinction still exists and s _he only exception to the common 
debto r rule . 
47 Ibid, 99 , 088. 
48 Above, n46, 99,088 . 
49 Above n42. This issue has bee. discussed a length because 
there are two cases that Meaoher says contradicts the common 
debtor requirement (see para:},)) . The first is Sou h v Bloxarr 
(1865) 2 Hem & M 457; 71 ER 541, where it was held that a single 
chargee could marshal against he mul iple chargee's rights over 
the surety . As this case has almos identical facts to New 
Zealand Mercantile and here is no material fact that 
distinguishes the two cases, Sou h v Bloxam cannot be taken as 
representing the present law . The second case is In re Islip, ex 
parte Official Assignee (1907) 26 NZLR 1293 . There the Court held 
that the Official Assignee could marshal against property held 
by the bankrupts wife, wh o was sure y for the multiple chargee's 
debt. This cases is, however, dis inguishable on the basis that 
marshalling was only applicat:e because of the operation of a 
statute (s5 of The Married ¼omen ' s Prcper y Ac 1884). The effect 
of the s t at u t e was t o make :::. he ,,_, i f e ' s proper t y pa rt of the 
husband ' s estate for the purposes o_ bankruptcy , thereby making 
the wife ' principally' liable f J: t.!.e eb to the multiple 
chargee and subject to marsha! i~~ claims. 
1..., 
- I 
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6. Another limitation unique to New Zealand is outlined in the 
Court of Appeal decision of The King v The Westport Harbour 
Board. 50 The Westport Harbour Board Act 1884 created a statutory 
fund to which the Board and the ~town cou d look to satisfy a 
certain debt. The Board also had its own assets from which it 
could satisfy the debt. It was, cherefore, a situation where the 
Board had two funds from which co satisfy the debt and the Crown 
only one. 51 
Council Fun J 3 1.1::or y Fund 
A A B 
Although, this appears to be a clas sic situation where 
marshalling should apply, William s J reasoned that when the 
statutory fund was created ic was co be applied for the 
repayment of the two debts and the Act ··7 did not allow for the 
repayment of one, then the repayme nt of the other. Accordingly, 
the doctrine of marshalling ca~nor over -r i de the repayment of a 
debt pursuant to an Act . 
H. PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE 
This part of this paper outlines the practical application of 
the doctrine and some of the problems that arise as a result. 
1. SIMPLE MARSHALLING 
X(Value $10) 
A(Value of charge 
to A $10) 
B(Value of charge 
to B $15) 
Y(Value $1 0) 
A(Value of charge 
to A $10) 
f(Value $10) 
A(Value of charge 
to A $10) 
In this example, the chargor .. as ':3iven a. charge over X, 1 and f 
to A for $10, then a subsequent charge over X to B for $15. If 
A realises X to recover its debt, equi ty states that if there is 
insufficient security over X o satisfy E 's debt B may marshal 
against the 'surplus security ' of A over rand f . 
50 (1905) 25 NZLR 449. 
51 Ibid, 461. 
'
2 Section 12 of The west.port Harbour Board Act 1884. 
53 Above, nSO, 461 . 
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Prima facie , ' surplus securicy' equals he total value of the 
charges over X and y and I ($30) minus the value of the 
depletion of the common securi y by A ($10), which equals $20. 
With access to $20 of surplus securicy , B can easily satisfy its 
debt of $15 . However , marshal ling seeks only to put the single 
chargee in the position it would have been in "but for" 54 the 
depletion of the common securicy by che multiple chargee. As A 
depleted the common securicy co che value of $10, B is only 
entitled to marshal agains A over rand~ o a maximum of $10. 
Therefore, if B's claim is s~·~Pss~~: B ~:11 be subrogated to 
the rights of A over y and 1;_ t:...1 cr.e va:ue :if $10 . 
2 . MARSHALLING BY APPORTI ONMENT 
X (Value $10) 
A (Value of charge 
to A $10) 
B (Value of charo 
to B $15) 
Y (Value $15) 
A (Value of charge 
co A $10) 
C (Value of charge 
to C $15) 
This is an example of two compecing chargees. The chargor grants 
a charge over X and y to A for $10, then a charge over X to B 
for $15 and finally a charge over y to C for $15. As in the 
previous example , A realises X to satisfy its debt. 
Although , equity cannot control che order of realisation of the 
properties by the multiple cha rgee, if by this realisation 
prejudice is caused to either single chargee, equity provides 
that A' s debt is to be apportioned notionally between all the 
property to cause the leas prejudice to all the single 
chargees. 55 
54 T . Schumacher. "Mar shalling - An Old Rule in a Modern 
World " (Aug 1989) Accountan s ' Journal 34 . 
s; Barnes v Racster (1842) l Y&C . C.C . 401, 62 ER 944; Sugden 
v Bignold 2 Y&C.C.C. 377; Smych v Toms [1918) 1 IR 338 ; Gibson 
v Seagrim (1855) 20 Beav 614 , 52 ER 741 ; White v The London 
Chartered Bank of Australia (1877) 3 VLR 33 ; Ollivier v Colonial 
Bank (1887) 5 NZLR 239; Flint v Howard [1893) 2 Ch 54 ; Baglioni 
v Cavalli (1900) 83 LT 500 ; In re Crothers (1929) VLR 49; 
Victoria & Grey Trust Co v B:c~:e1 c:::- al ( 1 971) 14 DLR (3d) 28 . 
19 
-I . 
Apportionment is relative to he respective values of 
properties. For example A's debt of $10 is spread across X 
y, as follows: 
X. $10(Value of X) X $10(Value of A's debt) = $100 = $4 
$25(Combined value of 
Y. $15(Value of Y) X $10(Va 
$25(Combined value of 
Notional Apportionment : 
Real Apportionment: 
X $10 
A $4 
B $6 
X $10 
A $10 
X and 1) $25 
ue of A's debt) = $150 
X and 1) 
Y $15 
A $6 
C $9 
Y $15 
$25 
A $10 (B $6, C $4) 
·c S5 
= $6 
the 
and 
Therefore , Bis entitled to $6 of the surplus security and C $4 
plus $5 which is the remainder of y once the surplus security is 
used up. 
This formula for marshalling will work in all situations 
although the equations may become more complex. 
3 . THE RIGHTS OF SUBSEQUENT SINGLE CHARG EES 
X $10 
A $10 
B $15 
Y $15 
A $1CJ 
C $9 
D $1 
This example is the same as the previous one , except that C ' s 
charge is only for a value of $9 and there is a third charge 
over y to D for $1. The calculations will be the same as in 2. 
because all the relevant figures, the value of Kand Y and the 
surplus security, are the same. Bis , therefore , entitled to be 
subrogated to $6 of the surplus security over Y. and C is 
entitled to be subrogated o the other $4 of surplus security 
under y . C is also entitled to the excess of $5 under r to 
satisfy the rest of its debt. This leaves D with only a personal 
claim against the chargor for which here is now no security. 
20 
..., 
-\ 
Notional Apportionmenc: 
Real Apportionment : 
X $1 0 
A $4 
B $6 
X $10 
A $10 
y $ 1 c; 
A So 
C $9 
D $0 
y $l5 
~ ... -
C :-c:, ,' ~ 
r, so 
( ~ $ l, I ~ $4) \., 
This situation where D's security interest is subject to B' s 
right to marshal is consistent throughout the case law. 56 Bis 
considered on an equal foo ing with C and superior to Das to 
the entitlement to the surplus security . Only once A's charge 
been apportioned rateably and C' s deb has been satisfied does 
D have any entitlement tor. In ocher words , D's entitlement to 
Y is unprotected from and subjec co B' s right to marshal 
against the surplus security over Y . Clearl y, this is very much 
to the detriment of a single chargee in D's position . It denies 
D protection as a secured er-editor again st persons without a 
prior secured interest in the propercy. 
The argument offered in favour of denying D this protection is 
that D knew its interest was subject to the prior claim of A 
and, by giving B access to this prior claim, D's claim is not 
prejudicing D's claim any more than it could have been 
prejudiced by A exercising its ful l rights of realisation over 
:f... 57 If A had satisfied itself OU of :f.. to the full amount of its 
debt D would be in the same pos2c1rn . 
4. COMMERCIAL USE OF MARSHA~.~ T!'Jr:: 
Marshalling seeks to protect those who have an interest in 
property from the prejudicial realisation o f that property by a 
prior claimanc. If used properly , he d0ctrine of marshalling 
w i 11 almost guarantee payme nt of a debt , even in a situation 
where the security is ' over secured '. 
56 Idem. 
51 Above nl, 693,694. 
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For example: 
X $100 Y $200 
A SlOC A SlOO 
In this example there are two properties, J valued at $100 and 
'j_ valued at $200. There is also a charge over both to A for 
$100. If the chargor then approaches a financier , B, hoping to 
raise capital, but is unwilling to permit another charge over 'j_, 
the financier may take a cl:.arge over X and fee: reasonabl y 
confident of recovering its deb, even though f is already fully 
secured i . e . debts against f equal ics value . By calculating the 
amount of surplus security that it would be entitled to in the 
event of A dep leting f, B can calculate the amount it is safe to 
lend the chargor. In other words, presume the chargo r charges f 
in favour of Band 'j_ in favour of C . Later A satisfies its debt 
from X. To what extent is B entitled to be subrogated to the 
surplus security over Y? 
X. SlOO(Value of X) x SlOO(Val e of A' s debt) = 
$300(Value of X and 'j_ ) 
'j_ . $200(Value of Y) x $100(Value of A's debt) = 
$300(Val ue of X and 'j_) 
Notional Apportionment : 
X $100 
A $33 
B $? 
Y $200 
A $67 
B's entitlement : $100 (Value off) 
$100 = 
$3 
$33 
$200 = $67 
$3 
- $33 (A ' s debt apportioned to f) 
= $6 7 (Maximum value of B's entitlement 
to he surplus security) 
Regardless of the fa ct chat X is already fully secured B can 
take a charge ove r r up to a value of $67 . This is the value of 
surplus security that B is entitled o be subrogated to should 
A deplete J. 
This entitlement is subject only to cwo exceptions. The first 
arises where A releases r as security for its debt, in which 
case B has nothing to marshal agains . It is not common for a 
multiple chargee to do his , bu 1: can happen . The second 
exception arises fr om che fac ha mashalling is not an 
enforceable righc , it is merely a remedy which the court in its 
discretion may award . 0 " 
58 See Exercising a Claim o Marshal page 12 . 
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I . MARSHALLING IN RELATION TO THI RD PARTIES 
One of the many limitati ons :.. :,•ars: .dl.:..1 ng highlighted earlier 
is that, marshalling w~ l nc· c~~!-~e :o the prejudice of third 
parties . 0 9 This pa rt of t h1 s pa per di scu sses the scope of the 
limitation , particularly in re lati o . . t o unsecured creditors and 
volunteers. 
1 . THE PROTECTI ON OF THIRD PARTI ES 
The authority generally c i te d fo:::- =~ .e b r o ad propo sition, that 
marshalling will not operate t o h pre j udice of third parties, 
is the 1870 House of Lords c as e decision o f Dolphin v Aylward . 60 
The facts of the case are rea son a bl :r· complex, but the basic 
position, for our purpose, is as follo ws . 
X 
A 
C 
y -----B 
A 
First , the settlor made a voluntary settlement of r on trust to 
B, h i s family . However , by virtue of a statute , the settlor was 
able to defeat the trust creat ed fo~ h is family , so far as the 
mortgages to A over X and y e:~ ended .· Later C became a judgment 
creditor with an entitlement o he equity of redemption of x. 
The settlor then defaulted o n the mo rtgage, so A realised X to 
satisfy its debt. C then sought to marshal against A's rights 
over y. The House of Lords held that C was only entitled to the 
same r ights to Y as the settlor possessed when C became a 
judgment creditor . 62 As the sett lor had no rights or claims 
against the settled property, C could not acquire any either and 
marshalling was held to be inapp l i c a ble t o this situation . 
The decision itself is no d ou b t co r rect . Title to X was validly 
transferred t o Band it was =~ly [Y reaso~ o f the operation o f 
a statute that the settl o r was atle o ~o rcgage X in favour of 
A. B should not then be fu r her· ~ re judiced by permitting C to 
marshal against A's rights over y, Pven th ough Bis a volunteer . 
59 See page 1 3 . 
60 Dolphin v Aylward ( 187() : I<. -1 HI, 4 6 . 
6 1 Ibid , 499 . 
62 Above n 6 0 , 5 0 3 . 
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LAW UBRN"'Y 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF V,'CU ... i:C..TO: 
There are , however , problems with dicta in the case . During the 
course of his dee is ion The Lord Chancellor, Lord Hat her ley, 
discusses a hypothet i ea 1, in wh 1 eh t he order of events in 
Dolphin v Aylward is varied. 
X 
A 
C 
y --- B 
A 
First , the settl o r grants a mortgage ove r~ and X in favour of 
A, X is then settled on Band, finally, a second mortgage over 
X is granted in favour of C. 
Of this hypothetical Lord Hather l ey sta ed: 
I apprehend that [CJ c ann o ... affec the interests created 
in third parties by the d octrine o f marshalling, that is to 
say, [CJ cannot throw the mo rtgage [ over ~) upon [Xl, the 
estate conveyed away by t h e v o luntary settlement, in order 
that [CJ may leave [~ ] e nti re ly c lear and free from 
mortgage debt . 63 
Cont rary to this dicta is th~ 191 0 Supreme Court decision of 
Wi 11 iams . J in Re Stephenson. 61' 
A man mortgages two properties. Subsequent to the mortgage 
he makes a voluntary conveyan c e of the equity of redemption 
of one of them. In this co n v e yan c e there is no covenant on 
his part to pay off the mo rtg a ge or to indemnify the 
transferees from it, nor any indication of any intention to 
make over the property to the transferees discharged from 
the mortgage . The equity o f redemption is all that is 
conveyed. The position is the same as where a man has 
mortgaged his property a n d afterwards sells the equity of 
redemption or part of it o a th ird person ... There is no 
bargain, express o r i mpli d , or he part o f the vendor that 
the burden should b e tn rowri , r-- "r. n is pa rt of the property. 
If there is an equi ty ... it i s onl y that the burden of the 
debt should be borne i n propo rti o n to the value of the 
properties. '' 
In Re Stephenson Williams J mak es a cle a r distinction between a 
transfer of title and a transf e r of h e equity of redemption. It 
appears that where title is transferred, the transferee is 
protected from marshalling cla ims by the 'common debtor rule' , 
63 Above n56, 501. 
6 4 (1910) 3 0 NZLR 1 45 . 
6
" Ibid, 14 6 . 
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because the claim is n o longer against the pr operty of the same 
debtor, ownership in the proper y having passed to a third 
party. However, where only the equity of redemption i s 
transferred, the situat ion is ana OL .s -o ~he gran t of a sec ond 
mortgage. For example: 
( 1) X 
A 
C 
y ----B 
A 
( 2) X 
A 
y 
A 
B 
In examples 1) and 2) the c ha rger g r ants a mortgage over X in 
favour of A. Under the mo rt gage itle is transferred to A and 
the mortgagor retains the equ ity of redemption. In example (1) 
this is then transferred to B . However , in example (2) the 
equity of redempti o n i s tr ansferred to B b y way of a sec o n d 
mortgage. Finally, in b o th e xamples , a mortg age of the equity o f 
redemption of r is grante d in favour of C . 
In example (2) , B and C compete equa l l y f o r any surplu s 
security. However, in e xample (1) B is e x a lt ed to a positi o n 
where it is not only protected fr om an y marshalling claims by C, 
but can also marshal to the pre j u d i c e o f C. In both examples, 
ownership is retained by A, and Bis onl y entitled to the equity 
of redemption. Given the simi l ar ity , i t is arguably unjust for 
B to attain this special protection in e~amp l e (1), particularly 
if Bis a volunteer. 
Probably, the best interpretati on of th e c ases is, that only 
transferees of title to the charged property are third parties 
deserving of protection against marshalling claims . Under this 
analysis, transferees for va lue o f the equity of redemption 
compete equally with sing l e chargees for any surplus secur i t y 
and volunteers stand unpr o t ected against the marshalling claims 
o f single chargees . I t must be rernE~tered hat ma r shalling is an 
equitable remedy and e quity does nc: generally prot ect o r af fo rd 
remedies to volunteers. In fac .1s 1s the p ositi o n take n by 
the Irish courts 66 a n d by he Mas et of the Rolls, Sir J o h n 
Leach, in Lomas v Wr i g ht . ' I th3t.. case he held that a mere 
volunteer is "not ent itled tc cornpete with creditors ... f o r 
valuable considerati on " b ut only against other volunteers. 68 (M y 
emphasis) 
66 Ker V Ker (18 69) 4 IR Ec..i E . 
67 (1835) 2 My & K 769 , 39 ER 1138 . 
68 Ibid, 7 4 4 , 11 4 0 . 
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If, however, this analysis is incorrect, the literal application 
of Dolphin v Aylward will mean that , any person who takes a 
transfer of the chargor ' s in erest, whether it be the title or 
some lesser interest, is protected fr0m the marshalling claim of 
any single chargee whose charge was granted after 69 that 
transfer. 
2. VOLUNTEERS AND TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS 
evident that the law in 
by reason of inter vivos 
It is clear , however, that 
by reason of testamentary 
deserving of protection fr om 
From the discussion above, i is 
relation to third parties who take 
dispositions, is not yet settled. 
third party volunteers , who take 
dispositions , are not third parties 
marshalling claims . 10 
The first of the New Zealand authori ties on this point is In re 
Tremain . 71 
Real Estat e 
Bank 
Creditors 
Policies -----Wife 
Bank 
A testator charged a life insurance policy and some real estate 
in favour of a bank. By his will he bequeathed the proceeds of 
the policies to his wi fe (a volunteer). At his. death the bank 
realised the policy in satisfaction of its debt. Unsecured 
creditors of the deceased then sought to satisfy their debts 
from the real estate. The wife , however , attempted to marshal 
against the bank ' s rights to the real estate, to recover some of 
what was lost from the p olicy . The Court of Appeal found that 
69 Notice of prior charg s is im:11aterial to claims of 
marshalling by apportionment and this seems to indicate that 
trans ferees take subject to he marshalling claims of single 
chargees whose charges were granted before the transfer : Aldr ich 
v Cooper (1803) 3 Ves Jun 392 , .5:JO , 32 ER 402 , 408, Gibson v 
Seagrim (1855) 20 Beav 614 , 619 , 52 ER 741 , 7 43, Flint v Howard 
(1893) 2 Ch 54 , 72 , 73 and Smyth v Toms (1918) 1 IR 338, 346 , 
347 . 
70 Hughes v Williams (185 2) 3 Mac & G 683 , 41 ER 423; Re 
Darby's Estate (1907) 2 Ch 465; In re Ainge , Wheeler v Bank of 
Australia (1935) NZLR 691 ; In re Wa kins , Guardian Trust and 
Executors Co v Watkins (1938) NZLR 847 ; In re Coote , Coote v 
Public Trust ee (1939) NZLR 757 . Se~ alSJ Bisset v Australia and 
New Zealand Bank L d (1961] NZLR 687 . 
1
' In re Tremain , Tremain v P, :ic Trustee [1934) NZLR 369 . 
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apart from one decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria, 72 the 
doctrine of marshalling had not been applied in favour of a 
chargor or its representative as against its creditors . Of the 
Victorian decision, MacGrego r J said t hat it was not a "safe or 
authoritative guide", '3 because al l the other Australian 
authorities were against the wid ow 's contention . Therefore, the 
wife was unable t o marshal agains t the general creditors. 74 
A similar case is In re Coote , Coo e v Public Trustee, 1 s 
General Assets 
Bank 
Creditors 
Po licies -----Wife 
Bank 
In this case, the bank rea l ised the general assets of the 
deceased's estate to satisfy i ts de b t . Beca use of this depletion 
the creditors were not able t o s a ti sfy their debts. They, 
therefore , att.empted to marsh al c1~ainst. the surplus security 
held by the bank overt.he po li c i es . Reed J in the Supreme Court 
held that the creditors were unable to succeed , but only by 
reason of s65 of the Life Insurance Act 1908, 1 6 which prevented 
life insurance policies from being available for the 
satisfaction of creditors. However, in a later case involving 
similar facts Bisset v Australia and New Zealand Bank Ltd77 the 
Court of Appeal held that s65 will not prevent a marshalling 
claim by unsecured creditors from succeeding . 
Where a debtor simply assig n s the whole of his estate to 
creditors, he is clearly protected by s65 as to ... his life 
policy; but ... [ i Jn the present case , he has abandoned it to 
the extent of the amoun t o f the Bank ' s debt and has by his 
own deliberate act made it amenable to the Bank's claim. If 
therefore another creditor is ab le in equity to require the 
bank to have recourse t o this fund (which the debtor by his 
own act has made amenable t o the Bank's claim) no injustice 
appears to be done, n o r is the pu r p ose of the statute in 
7 2 In re Crothers (19 29] VLR 49 . 
73 Above n6 7 , 388. 
7 4 Note the similarity between this situation and the 
situation in Dolphin v Aylward (1870) LR 4 HL , above at page 23 , 
but the different result. 
7
S (1939] NZLR 457 . 
76 The sect ion was re pea led by secti o n 4 ( 9) of the Life 
Insurance Reform Act 198 5 a n d has no t been replaced . 
77 Above, nl. 
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any way offended . . . Marshalling is a doctrine which enables 
a person who has no security in law or equity against [an] 
asset . . . to become subrogated to such a claim, if the 
creditor entitled to resor t to this and other assets by his 
election deprives him of his security . 78 
This may or may not be t he low wa ter mark for volunteers' 
protection. In any event, as regard testamentary dispositions, 
the cases appear to lay dow n a s et o f p ri o rity rules. First, a 
volunteer stands un prot e c t ed against the marshalling claims of 
people with a b o na fide entitleme nt f or va lue against the debtor 
and secured creditors. Secondly, people with a bona fide 
entitlement against the debtor stand unprotected against the 
marshalling claims of secured creditors. ' 9 
J . COVENANTS PREVENTING MARSHALLI NG 
Although, a single chargee may app ly t o a court to marshal 
against a multiple c ha r gee f or any surplus se c urity, there are 
various ways of preventing this . This is generally acheived by 
incorporating 'c o ve nants preven t i ng marshalling ' into the 
releva nt security agreement. This part of this paper discusses 
some of these covenants and their varying success . 
1. PROTECTING THE CHARGOR 
a) A security agreement may require the single chargee to 
covenant not to marshal. This prevent s the single chargee from 
being granted access to securitie s t o satisfy its debt other 
than those securities specifically identified in its security 
agreement. For example: 
X 
A 
B 
78 Above nl, 693, 694. 
y 
A 
7 9 In this situat i on , a " single chargee " is a pers o n with a 
secured interest in the debt o r s p roperty . 
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Such a covenant preventing the single chargee , B, from 
marshalling ensures that, sh o uld A realise X to satisfy its 
debt, Bis unable to marsha l a gain s t any surplus security over 
x. "The difficulty ... lies i n persuadi ng a single chargee to 
agree to be at the mercy of the multiple chargee with regard to 
the order of realisation of se c urities. 11 ~
0 
b) The simplest and mos t effect" ve way of preventing 
marshalling, from the p o int o f v ie w o f the chargor , comes from 
the first of the limit.a t1ons · o : .. -rshalll .. g outlined under G. 
Limitations o n t.he Right t o Marsha: , ha t is, "no right to 
marshal exists where the multiple chargee does not have equal 
recourse to each security to satisfy its debt ". 81 For example: 
X 
A 
B 
y 
A 
A's security agreement with he c harqo r may require that A only 
satisfy itself from X if X is deficien t. In the absence of a 
provision of this kind, A wo u l d be e ntitled to satisfy itself 
from either X or Y and if 'this depleted X B could marshal 
against any surplus security over x. But if A is only entitled 
to resort to X to satisfy its debt to the extent that X is 
deficient, then once A' s debt is satisfied any right to seek 
recourse to X is extinguished and B has nothing to be subrogated 
to. A single chargee ' s right t.o marshal is, therefore, only 
against surplus security over property to which the multiple 
chargee has a 'first right of recourse'. This situation is 
analogous to the principal/surety situation where a single 
chargee can only marshal agains the security of the principal, 
the person against. who t he r e is he fi rst r ight to recourse. 8 2 
This is arguably the mos effec i ve way f o r a chargor to prevent 
marshalling by single chargees . It i s more effective than (a) 
for two reasons. 
1. Under (a), the chargo r mus neg c tiate with the single 
chargees in an attempt t o get hem to agree not to marshal, 
whereas under this opti on neqotiaL i on is with the multiple 
chargee. 
00 T.Schumacher "Marshalli ng - An Old Rule in a Modern World" 
(Aug 1989) Accountants' J ourn a 3 4, 36 . 
81 Page 13. 
82 See limitati o n 5, p a g e :s . 
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2. There will normally be no problem in requiring the 
multiple chargee to agree t o seek recourse from one 
security before another, because this does not affect the 
multiple chargee's pri o r a nd paramo unt claim , nor does it 
affect the total value of the property subject to its 
security agreement with the chargor. 
2 . PROTECTING A MULTIPLE CHARGEE 
A multiple chargee might r equire che chargo r t o covenant, in its 
favour , that if any subsequen secu!'." · ::: y agreement is granted 
over any property which the multiple c hargee has security , that 
agree ment will itself contain a covenant by the subsequent 
chargee not to marshal. The multiple chargee seek s in this 
fashion to avoid the risk that a single chargee ' s right to 
marshal might interfere with its ability to realise the 
properties in any chosen order. This risk is more imaginary than 
real . Marshalling does not interfere with a multiple chargee ' s 
right to realise the securities. It is not a preventative 
doctrine. It remedies the pre jud ic ia l ac ts of a multiple chargee 
and generally will not restra in th e multiple chargee in any 
way . 83 This covenant against marshalling is really only of use to 
a multiple chargee in cases where it has an intere s t in 
protecting the surplus security of the chargor . For example: 
X 
A 
B 
y 
A 
If A seeks to sati s fy its debt , the chargor might pers ua d e A to 
reali s e in such a manner as to defeat B's charge and preserve y. 
A might be a friend , a relative, a subsidiary or a parent 
company of the chargor. 
A covenant by B n o t t o mar shal ag a inst any s urplus security held 
by A will, generally, prote c t A f r om he ma rshlling claims of B, 
but it is unclear what protection, if any, it will provide if 
there is evidence of bad faith on A's part. 8 4 
8 3 See The Juridical Nature of Marshalling page 5 . 
84 See The Juridical Nature o f Marshalling page 8 for a 
discussion on the liabilit y o f multi pl e chargees who transfer 
property in bad faith and o f third party transferees who take 
with notice of this bad faith. 
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3. PROTECTING THE SINGLE CHA RGEE 
con ains a covenant by the 
:n its o wn favour . Thi s 
is an equity that belongs 
marshal in its own favour 
a) A security agreement some imes 
charger that it will not marsha 
covenant is meaningless. Marshalling 
to single chargees. A chargor cannot 
even if it so desired . 
b) Another potentially useful covenant against marshalling is 
where a single chargee require s t .e rha rgor to covenant that if 
any subsequent charges are gran ea ove r any property already 
charged by a multiple chargee , hen chat subsequent chargees 
must covenant not to marsha l. For example : 
X 
A 
B 
y 
A 
C 
The chargor c harges X and Yin favour of A and then wishes to 
borrow further money. Fina ncier , B, agrees to lend money on the 
basi s of a charge over X and a covenant by the chargor that , if 
any subsequent charges are gr~nted over property already charged 
by the multiple chargee, A, then such chargees must covenant not 
to marshal against any surplus security held by A . 
If the chargor requires such a covenant of C, the effect of it 
will be two-fold. 
1. It will protect B against any marshalling claim of C in 
the event of A realising y to satisfy its debt, because C 
has contracted out of any rights t o marshal against surplus 
security held by A; and 
2 . It will permit B ~O . aY sr.al aaainst C on an equal 
footing in the evenc or A real1s ng X t.o satisfy its debt 
i . e . marshalling by apportionmen t . ·' 
In all , there are some very effective 
marshalling and should marsha lling become 
is likely to be the largest grow h area 
developments. 
ways of preventing 
more prominent, this 
in respect of legal 
8 5 Because B is not subject to a simila r covenant it can 
still marshal against any surplus securi y held by A over Y-
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K. OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS 
As an equitable doctrine marshalling is sill in its infancy and
 
therefore there are still some unresolved conceptual problems.
 
This part of this paper looks at these problems and suggests
 
some solutions . 
PROBLEM 1 
w X y z 
A A A A 
B B 
C C 
D 
In this example a first, second, third and fourth charge exist
 
over properety X in favour of A, B, C and D, respectively. A 
also has a first charge over~, X and~ , Ba second charge over 
rand Ca second charge over~ . If A, Band C decide to realise
 
X to satisfy their debts and there is insuf ficient to satisfy 
D' s debt , D is able to marshal. But unlike other earlier
 
examp les , where there is only one person against whom to
 
marshal , here there are three multi ple chargees, A, Band C . The
 
question here, is against whom can or must D marshal first? This
 
question is particularly important to the chargor where the
 
properties have an appreciating or depreciating value . It is
 
arguable that A or C should be marshalled against first , A being
 
the first to prejudice X and C the last. However , the point is 
yet to b e raised in the courts and basic principles of
 
marshalling are of no help. 
A similar problem arises in the following example : 
w 
A 
X 
A 
B 
z 
A A 
In this example, a first charge to A is granted over~, X, X and 
~- Then a second charge is granted over X in favour of B. In the
 
event that A realises X to satisfy its debt and there is 
insufficient to satisfy B's debt, what restri ctions , if any , are
 
there on B in choosing wh ich property to marshal against to
 
satisfy its debt ?
80 
86 This is sue should not be con fuse d with the earlier 
discussion of the ' notional' apportionment of the multiple
 
chargee ' s debt between the securities. This issue involves the
 
' actual' realisation of the securi ies . See Marshalling by 
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When the charger grants a charge in favo r of A, it abandons its 
right t o have the first and foremost clai m to the property and 
it has been said that there ~s hen no preJ dice in allowing the 
single chargee access to he s rp.1.us secur~ y . q It , it could be 
argued that the single chargee should be allowed to realise 
whatever property it chooses. The better view is , however , that 
the charger abandons this right to the first claim to the 
property only in respe ct of the multiple c hargee to whom the 
charge is originally granted. Because marshalling is an 
equitable remedy and not a proprie ary interest , 
88 where there is 
more than one security from which he singe chargee can satisfy 
its debt , the charger and not he single cha rgee should have the 
right to determine which proper y will be realised . Applying 
this to the example given above , the cha rgor w i 11 determine 
which property or combination of properties is to be realised t o 
satisfy B ' s debt. 
89 
PROBLEM 2 
X 
A 
B 
y 
A 
This example is similar to some of the previous examples of 
marshalling, except that instead of the charger breaching the 
security agreement with the multiple chargee, A, the charger 
breaches it with the single chargee , B , who then exercises a 
power of realisation over x. The unresolved question is whether 
B can marshal against any surplus security under Y if A 
satisfies its debt from x. The authors of Meagher see this as a 
problem because it is the single chargee, B, and not the 
multiple chargee, A, who has exercised the p o wer of 
realisation . 90 A better vie1,s1 is hat the single chargee is 
Apportionment page 19. 
87 Above , nl, 693. See also pages 27 and 28 . 
88 See The Juridical Nature of Marshalling page 5 . 
8 9 Note that this propos it io is only pass ible where the 
charger has reta ined all the interest o the securities and has 
not transferred any interes to a third party voluntarily or for 
value. In this situati on , there ~111 be competing interests and 
marshalling by apportion men !lla y be applicable. See I. 
Marshalling in Relati on o Third Par 1es , page 23 . 
90 Meaghe r para 1135 , 1136 , 113 7 . 
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entitled to marshal rega r dl ess of who exercises a power of 
realisation. The act of the mul iple ch argee in deciding from 
which se c urit y to satisfy it.s deb is the crucial act which 
creates a mar shalling right . Wh re A has only just realised~ 
and X and has not decided from which sec urity to satisfy its 
debt there has been no prejudicial act of the multiple chargee 
for equity to remedy. It is not until A decides from which 
security it will satisfy its debt that the single chargee can 
claim a marshalling right. If, however, the courts decide that 
the exercise of the power of realisation by the single chargee 
disentitles it to marsha l , then the only means for a single 
chargee in B's position to gain access to the surplus security 
is to buy out A and then rea lise the secu rities and satisfy A's 
debt in a manner that causes he least prejudice to B's 
security, ~. 91 B is in ef fect consolidating the charges. This 
action requires the multiple chargee ' s agreement , may not be 
permitted by the security agreement and may even be illegal.
92 
L. CONCLUSION 
Even though the origins of the doctrine can be traced back to 
the mid-eighteenth century, mar sha 11 ing is st i 11 undeveloped. 
There are as few as thirteen· decisions on marshalling in New 
Zealand. Therefore, the unresolved issues in this area are 
likely to remain unresol ved for some time. In practice, 
marshalling should not give rise to problems of enforcement as 
multiple chargees will genera lly have no reason to resist a 
marshalling claim: a multiple chargee 's interest is prior and 
paramount and unaffected by marshalling claims against the 
surplus security that it holds. The most serious problem facing 
a single chargee may well be that it will not know that a prior 
chargee is a 'multiple chargee' and has other securities from 
which to satisfy its debt. This problem is one of 'disclosure' 
in that a prior chargee is under no obligation to disclose to a 
subsequent chargee that there 1: o her property against which it 
may seek to marshal should the p~ior chargee satis fy its debt 
from common property . It is possible that this lack of 
disclosure is one of the reasons why marshalli ng claims are so 
scarce and that marshalling's far reaching application is not 
being fully utilised, particularly in the wake of the recent 
stock market crash and the resulting company and personal 
bankruptcies. Hopefully, increased awareness of the doctrine's 
potential will remedy this situation. 
91 Thorne v Cann [1895] AC 11 ; Whiteley v Delaney (1914) AC 
132; Ghana Commercial Bank v Chandiram [1960) AC 732. 
92 The consolidation of mortgages is prohibited by s85 o f 
the Property Law Act 1952. 
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